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Abstract: French  philosopher  H. Bergson criticizes general  philosophy insofar as  it  neglects or 
even  ignores  the  temporality  of  time.  Concerning  general philosophy,  Bergson's  remarks  
are  probably outdated, whereas contemporary philosophy  of science  does continue to encounter 
analogous problems.
For essentially group-theoretic reasons, physics, despite the presence of a temporal dimension in 
physical  spaces,  describes  atemporal  systems.  These  group-theoretic  reasons  being  at  the  origin 
of  physical  atemporality   also  ensure  the  extraordinary  epistemic  power  of  physics  based  
on  the  possibility  of  distortion-free partial approaches, symmetry  in prediction  and retro-diction, 
experimentation to be repeated under identical conditions, idealization, renormalization, and so on.
But  the  investigation  field  of  physics  allowing  such  group-theoretically founded approaches 
represents  a  highly  improbable  exception. So  any tentative to transpose physics beyond the 
boundaries of its group-theoretically delimited investigation field unavoidably leads to the problem 
raised by Bergson: a time reduced to something without temporality. This point undermines certain 
contemporary speculations advanced in the name of physics, such as “chaosogenesis” and, above all, 
linkages between multiverse approaches based on eternal inflation and the so-called “weak anthropic 
principle.”  
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0.Introduction
French  philosopher  H.  Bergson   wrote   that    philosophy   generally  does  not  grasp  what  is  
essential  for   time.  According to author of  L'Evolution créatrice,  time   is confused either with 
the   parameter t, or  with time  intervals  | tb – ta |.   In  our  days, this criticism may be outdated. 
Philosophers coming from various horizons had worked on time per se. Nevertheless, specifically 
in philosophy of physics, the problem raised by Bergson is still topical.
Let us try to identify this problem.
None  of  us  would  confuse  a  point  P or a line PaPb  with the space embedding these figures. 
Analogously, instants t and durations  | tb – ta  |  are not to be confused with time as such. And yet, 
honestly, can we say that the distinction we make between instants t or durations  | tb – ta | and time 
per se is as spontaneous as the distinction between points or lines and the space embedding them? 
Maybe  it  is  better  not  to  be  too  categorical  in  this  regard.  Denoting  respectively instants  and 
durations, the signs  “t”  and  “| tb – ta  |”  nevertheless  evoke “time.” A quick glance at physical 
terminology to the extent that it concerns us here confirms the foregoing. Randomly chosen, the 
Wikepedia  article  about  the  Minkowski  space-time mentions  “time” as an imaginary fourth 
coordinate. It is also significant that other Wikipedia articles dedicated to special relativity evoke 
length contraction  and  time dilation.  We  also  find  there  expressions  like  “'time'  registered  by 
clocks” and so on. Of course, in absolute terms, the foregoing does not prove much, and this paper 
does not have the vocation to compile statistics on usage in the physical literature of  “time” instead 
of “duration”, knowing that we do  not  really  need  such  statistics.  It is sure that the   reduction of  
time  to  duration  Bergson  had criticized regarding general philosophy manifests itself within 
physics.
Now, an important point to specify is: If  physics currently uses this kind of misnomer being finally  
rather  comfortable, it  is because this choice – in  contrast  to  what  may  happen  in   general 
philosophy  –  does  not generate trouble within the investigation field of physics. In this way, we 
begin to approach the Bergsonian challenge of this paper. For deep reasons we will have to identify,  
the  investigation  field  of  physics  consists  of  phenomena  where  the  reduction  of  time  to  
parameters/variables t or durations |tb – ta| is not a problem, whereas beyond the boundaries of the  
investigation field of physics, this kind of reduction leads to anti-scientific inconsistency absolutely  
analogous to what Bergson criticizes in the area of general philosophy.
But  let  us  not  advance  too  quickly.  First,  what  should  we  mean  by   “the boundaries of the  
investigation field of physics”? This issue  has a sense we can find through  Bergson's  statements 
about what the current contemporary philosophical jargon denotes by “spatialization of time.”
In space – here it can be our intuitive  Euclidean space  –  there is no privileged direction. For any 
given points Pa, Pb, , …  we  do  not  see any intrinsic difference between the translation Pa → Pb 
and its inverse translation  Pb → Pa. Concerning time, it seems to be different. “Common sense” and 
“intuition” tells us that “we cannot go back to the past.” From this intuitive perspective, we would 
assert – but please, pay attention to the conditional – that time expresses an intrinsic asymmetry 
opposed to the symmetry (Pa → Pb ) ↔ (Pb → Pa) characterizing space. Acting as if there were also 
an analogous symmetry (ta → tb) ↔ (tb → ta), we would “spatialize” the  time and so amputate its 
temporality (Bergson 1888, pp. 7f; p.54; pp. 71ff. Touchet, non-dated, pp. 9 ff.). 
However,  common  sense  and  intuition are  not  systematically good guidelines. In physics, we 
are not  interested in space, time,  space-time  or  even abstract spaces per se, but in  phenomena 
positioned  in  space, time,  space-time  or abstract spaces. So the expression (ta → tb) ↔ (tb → ta), 
independently  of  its  pertinence  or  non-pertinence,  does  not  concern us directly. Focusing on 
phenomena positioned in time to be noted in some way like φ(t), the expression (ta → tb) ↔ (tb → ta) 
is  to  be  replaced  by  (φ(ta) → φ(tb))  ↔  φ(tb)→ φ(ta),  and  from  this  perspective,  temporal 
asymmetries are not so simple,  nor  so  obvious as common sense and intuition seem to suggest it.  
Certainly, in the  light  cone, any (φ(ta), φ(tb)) appearing to a given observer so that tb  > ta, conserves 
this  temporal order for any observer able to observe φ. But physical laws are – nevertheless with a 
notable  exception  –  symmetrical  under  prediction  and  retro-diction.   There   is   no   intrinsic 
difference  between  a   prediction  φ(ta) →  φ(tb),   tb   > ta,  and the corresponding retro-diction 
φ(tb)→ φ(ta),  tb   > ta. The notable exception  is  of  course  irreversibility,  even if this provisional 
formulation later will be revised. Anyway, for  the  moment, let  us  retain  that systems being 
symmetrical  under  prediction  and  retro-diction  would  evolve “in  the  same   way” if “time  was  
inverted.” So, reversible   systems are  atemporal, whereas  irreversible  systems  affected   by   the 
asymmetry  between  φ(ta) → φ(tb),  tb  > ta,  and  φ(tb)→ φ(ta),  tb  > ta essentially express temporality.
The foregoing  simultaneously allows us to characterize – for the moment just characterize – the 
boundaries of the investigation field of physics and to correctly transcribe  Bergson's  criticism  into 
the  context  of  at  least  ideally  reversible/atemporal  physics  encountering  temporality through 
irreversibility in a wide sens (see below), that what necessarily leads to epistemological clashes.
Consisting of ideally reversible phenomena, i.e. phenomena with certain underlying symmetries, the 
investigation field of physics  stricto sensu  regroups phenomena formalizable by group-theoretic 
structures.  The links   between  symmetry  and  group theory still  need further  considerations, 
whereas  the  sole  group-theoretic formalizability of a given phenomenon is a necessary but not 
sufficient precondition for the phenomenon in question to belong to the investigation physics. We 
will   return  to  these  points.  But  the  foregoing  already should at least characterize the group-
theoretically determined boundaries of the investigation field of physics. Inside the investigation 
field  of  physics,  the  possibility  of  group-theoretically  formalizable approaches  does  ensure 
atemporality. So, outside, phenomena being non-formalizable in terms  of group theory  are subject 
to  temporality,  knowing  that  the  so-called  “physical”  irreversibility  is  just  a  special case of 
essentially  temporal  phenomena.  Even  if  “physical”   irreversibility  interferes with physics, it  
remains within the latter a kind of foreign body. What is interesting here is the obvious fact that the 
foundations  of  physics  implying  atemporality  inevitably  come into conflict with the temporal 
aspects of the world, as it is reflected by pages and pages dedicated by the philosophy of physics to 
“physical” irreversibility.
Subsequently,  the  transcription  of  Bergson's  criticism  into  the  context  of  at  least  ideally 
reversible/atemporal  physics  encountering  temporality  profiles  itself  as  follows:  The group-
theoretic  foundations  of  physics  confer  to  the  latter  an  extraordinary  epistemic  power  we  
do  not  find  anywhere else. So, physics can  succumb to the temptation to transpose its specific  
foundations  beyond its boundaries. But  these  essentially  reducing  approaches not only lead to  
fragile speculation, but also  to  characterized epistemological nonsense.
In  this way, the present paper begins through its sections 1.nm to 3.nm by a gradual elucidation of 
the group-theoretic roots of physical atemporality.
Section  4.nm  undertakes  a  generalization  of  the  so-called  “physical”  irreversibility comprising 
any phenomena subject to temporality because of their non-formalizability in group-theoretic terms, 
before  analyzing the exact nature of the unavoidable temporality-atemporability clash.
On  this  base,  section  5.nm  first   reformulates  according  to  our  context   Bergson's  criticism 
concerning  the  spatialization  of  time,  and  then  investigates  two  contemporary  speculations 
advanced in the name of physics and being très à la mode these days: (i) “chaosogenesis” and (ii) 
the WAP-fine tuned universe “justified” by the inflation-multiverse hypothesis, knowing that points 
(i) and (ii) have a common denominator. Whereas the  consistency  of  their  respective  inferences 
presupposes strictly group-theoretic frameworks, both approaches deliberately (?) neglect the  non-
group-theoretic transitions going from non-order to order and so reduce the temporality of time to a 
misplaced atemporality.
Note that more technical developments of this paper appearing in small characters possibly can be 
neglected and even ignored.
0.1  Some indispensable terminology clarifications 
In our introduction we we used the term “duration” as a synonym for “time interval”   | tb – ta  |. 
The  following developments will conserve this current sense of “duration”. However, we have to 
specify that Bergson means by “duration”  – la durée  – something essentially different. Moreover, 
Bergson denotes by “duration” that which, according to him, is the “real time”  –  le temps réel  – 
while  relegating  parameters/variables  ta, tb  or  time  intervals  | tb – ta  | to “the time as seen by 
physicists.”(Bergson, 1907, pp.196 ff; Bergson, 1969, pp. 7 ff.) Since  “duration”  belongs  to  the 
main  keywords of  Bergson's  work,  it  seems  legitimate to  ask whether the choice to use in this  
paper “duration”  in a sense opposite to that Bergson gives it is really a good idea.
Well, in this context, there is no globally satisfying solution. Bergson's view of time is not an aim 
per se of the present paper. It is rather more a background motivation for the elucidation of an issue 
concerning  specifically  the  investigation  field  of  physics  embedded  in an universe where the 
reducibility of any phenomena to physical laws is more (!!) than disputable. So, it is perhaps better 
for us to use the term “duration” in its current sense shared by physics. On the other hand, Bergson 
was  an  authentic pioneer in  the area which interests us here. As we mentioned it at the beginning 
of  the  introduction,  several  authors from  various  horizons  meanwhile  have  addressed  the  
specificity of time; their conceptualization work allows us in our days to denote by “temporality” 
what Bergson meant a  century ago with “duration.”
A time  interval  | tb – ta  |  can be directly measured by clocks. Provided we bear in mind that the 
possibility of such a measurement does not specify  time with respect to space, nothing prevents us 
from using the term “duration” as synonymous with “time interval.” What actually  expresses  the 
specificity  time  with  respect  to space consists, according to Bergson, of interactions between 
multiple  factors  which, measurable or not, are necessarily embedded within and  related  to  a 
non-specified   and  non-specifiable  whole,  knowing   that   the   latter   point  is  supposed  to 
generate  the  irreversibility essentially characterizing   temporal  phenomena (Bergson, 1907, pp. 
18 ff.). On  this subject, Bergson evokes “duration”, but (i) since we prefer to use “duration” in its 
current sense and (ii) since “temporality” as a term  being firmly  rooted  in  the    contemporary 
philosophical vocabulary denotes  what  Bergson calls “duration”, we attribute in this paper the 
quality of temporality to any  phenomenon  expressing  the  specificity  of  time. It is perhaps a way 
to  favor  clarity  by  the   recourse  to   contemporary  terminology  without  betraying  Bergson's 
thoughts.
That being said, and at the risk of repeating ourselves, the present paper is not about Bergson. Here,  
we  tackle  in  the  context  of  physics  a  problem  raised  by Bergson  in  an  essentially  different 
context which does not concern us directly. The present paper analyzes the clash between (i) the 
characteristic atemporality  of   the   investigation  field  of   physics   and (ii) other  areas   where  
the illegitimate exportation – or importation – of this atemporality leads to epistemological non-
sense. 
So,  let us begin elucidating the roots of physical atemporality.  
1. Irreversibility is not the negation of reversibility
At first glance, the title of the present section seems eminently farfetched. Common sense, practical 
logic,  grammar, orthography and whatever you want tell us that irreversibility is “obviously” the 
negation, or, if you prefer, the opposite of reversibility. 
In  fact,  it  is  not so simple, and  what we have to approach here will give us the key for our further 
investigations concerning the temporality/atemporality clash. 
First, note the following detail: For any factor A to be the direct negation of the  factor B, both 
factors A and B must refer to the same type of system. Certainly,  common sense still  seems to 
indicate  that  irreversibility  satisfies  this  condition:  A  gas  constituting  an  isolated  system  Σ 
characterized by its entropy variation ΔS ≥  0  seems to remain the “same” system Σ between its 
initial state ΣI corresponding to a low entropy S and its final state ΣF  with maximum entropy.  And 
if the entropy of the system Σ returned later to its initial minimum value – which is in fact  infinitely 
improbable  –  should we not still mention the “same” system just evolving differently?
However, contrary to the false evidence of “common sense”, the initial state ΣI and the final state ΣF 
of a  same irreversible  process does  not engage a  system remaining the “same” throughout  the 
transition.
Consider an ideal watch without internal frictions etc. whose needles turn by their own inertia at a  
constant speed. This system, as long as nothing disturbs it, is reversible with regard to the spatial 
configuration  of its needles; it will return to any configuration it occupies at a given moment. 
Under these conditions,  the system (i)  is characterized by an entropy variation ΔS = 0 and (ii) 
“remains the same” because it conserves its  functioning mode. Now let us create an irreversible 
situation  by  projecting  the system  violently to  the  ground. This  time  the  entropy variation 
gives  ΔS > 0, while the system – reduced to fragments – does not conserve its  functioning mode. 
Nobody  would seriously say that the fragments scattered on the ground are the “same” system as 
the ideal  watch  in operating condition. 
In  a  more  general  way,  the  ideal  reversibility   of  a  physical  system Σ ≡ Pi(xi) = φi(..., xj , …), 
i,j = 1, ... n, presupposes the conservation of the functioning mode fm(Σ) while its real irreversibility 
is  simply the non-conservation of  fm(Σ). Or, in other words, the conservation of the  functioning 
mode  fm(Σ)  underlies the  ideal  reversibility  of  a  physical  system  Σ,  whereas  irreversibility 
manifests itself on the level  of  fm(Σ).
“Underlying” v/s “on the level of” : this is at least a first indicator denoting that irreversibility is not 
the direct negation of reversibility. But, obviously, this point must be deepened.
For the moment, let us shorthand “reversibility” by “fm(Σ) ⇒ ct” where  and “irreversibility” by 
“(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)  →  non-(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)”;  where  “⇒ ct”  is  just  a  shorthand  sign  for  “remains 
unchanged.” Nevertheless, the second expression “(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)” is in fact 
more than simple shorthand. This point will be specified later.
Intuitively, let us say that reversibility and that reversibility and irreversibility are two essentially 
different aspects of the universe. Because of their essential differences, irreversibility can not be the 
negation of  reversibility and vice versa. Precisely this paper tries to show that ideal reversibility is a 
perhaps insufficient but absolutely necessary precondition for physics, and that subsequently the 
passage from ideally reversible phenomena to intrinsically irreversible ones is equivalent to the 
passage from physics to non-physics, with the well-known adverse consequences concerning the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, which as a kind of foreign body within physics is the source of 
endless discussions.
 
2. The precondition for reversibility; deepening the assertion “Irreversibility is not 
the negation of reversibility.”
Before turning  to the highly special epistemological status of physics within human knowledge, we 
have to elucidate the formal conditions for a given system to conserve its functioning mode through 
change. Admit in a general way that a system consists of a certain number of transformations. In our 
context,  the precise “nature” of these transformations can be neglected. By contrast, we must focus 
on the possibility of seeing a given transformation transformed into another one. Now, under which 
conditions  does  a  system conserve  its  identity  through  all  its  transformations  which  are  being 
transformed in other transformations?
There is a concise answer: The system in question must be ultimately formalizable in terms of the 
Klein  V-group.  Indeed,  the  V-group  consisting  of  four  transformations   e,  f,  g,  I,  where  any 
combination of transformations belonging to  V leads to a transformation belonging to  V, knowing 
that I is the identity transformation which conserves identically any transformation combined with 
it.  The Klein V-group has a remarkable property: the combination of all transformations belonging 
to V is equal to I:     I ⊥ e ⊥ g ⊥ f = I  
A bit  more  technically,  note  the  Klein  four-group  V  =  ({I,  e,  f,  g},  ⊥). The  four  elements  I,  e,  f,  g  are 
transformations.  ⊥  symbolizes the transformation  of any a ∈ {I, e, f, g} into a transformation   b ∈ {I, e, f, g}. 
“I”  designates  the  identity  transformation such as  ∀ a ∈ {I, e, f, g},  I ⊥ a = a ⊥ I = a.   For   e, f, g,   we  set 
∀ a ∈ {I, e, f, g}, a ⊥ a = I    and   e ⊥ f = f ⊥ e = g, f ⊥ g = g ⊥ f = e,  g ⊥ e = e ⊥ g = f.  It  is  easy  to  show that 
I ⊥ e ⊥ g ⊥ f = I. In fact, I ⊥ e  = e, so (I ⊥ e ) ⊥ f  = e ⊥ f = g. Since I ⊥ e  ⊥ f  = g,  (I ⊥ e  ⊥ f ) ⊥ g = g ⊥ g = I.
The  sentence  I  ⊥ e  ⊥ g  ⊥ f  =  I  formalizes  any  system  remaining  identical  through  all  its  
transformations.
So, concerning reversibility, we obtain (fm(Σ) ⇒ ct) ⇔ (fm(Σ) ⇒ V). Any form of irreversibility in 
contrast  expresses  the  transition  V → non-V.  The  functioning mode  fm(Σ) of  the  system  Σ  is 
obviously an intrinsic property of Σ, whereas the transition V → non-V occurs independently of the 
intrinsic  properties  of  the  concerned  system  Σ.  Consider  several  systems  with  very  different 
properties: a watch, a car engine, our Earth with its moon revolving around it etc. Let us smash this 
watch against a wall, forget to put oil in the car engine, imagine that a mega-meteorite pulverizes 
our Earth. The  result  implies  in  all  cases  the same transition  V → non-V. 
So we have a  compact  formal  framework determining whether  a  given system is  reversible  or 
irreversible,  whereas  it  seems  proved  that  reversibility  and  irreversibility,  epistemologically 
speaking, represent two different things.  
3. The particular epistemological status of physics and its group-theoretic roots
The laws of physics – with the notable exception of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but we 
will come back to the thorny status of irreversibility within physics  –  are ideally  reversible. So any 
physical  system,  always  with  a  significant  exception,  ideally specifies  in  one  or  another  way 
the Klein V-group. Since  the  latter, as its name indicates,  is  a  group,  ideally  reversible   physical 
systems  necessarily express group-theoretic structures. As such, the determining importance of 
group theory – we find presentations of its extent in (Tegmark, 2007, pp. 5 ff.) or (Yanofsky and 
Selcer,  2013,  pp.3  ff.)   –  is   not   astonishing;   we   will   see   it   through   the    following  
developments. What is astonishing – “infinitely” astonishing –  is the fact that there are phenomena 
consistent with a group-theoretic approach.
3.1 “Repeating an experiment under  identical conditions”
Every high school student knows – or at least should know – that the scientific validation of an 
experiment presupposes among others the possibility of repeating this experiment as often as we 
want under identical conditions. 
At first glance, this point seems trivial. And yet, there is a fundamental problem making the only 
possibility of experimenting “under identical conditions” highly exceptional. On the one hand, the 
context of a given phenomenon is constantly evolving. It is useless to repeat once again the (too) 
famous Heraclitean quotation. So, if we want to experiment “under identical conditions”, we have 
to isolate the phenomenon to be investigated from its constantly evolving context. On the other 
hand, we do not need to be great Hegelians to realize that the knowledge of a phenomenon taken 
out  of  its  context  is  intrinsically distorted knowledge.  Subsequently,   in  principle,  intrinsic  
distortion should be the price to pay for “experimenting under identical conditions.”
Now,  on  the  one  hand,  physics  certainly  encounters  superficial  distortion  due  to  experimental 
errors, disturbing factors and so on, but  no intrinsic distortion  at the level of its laws which are 
discovered despite any contingency hampering physical research. On the other hand, there is one 
and only one possibility allowing the partial and distortion-free approach of a whole consisting on 
related factors: Such a distortion-free approach is possible if and only if (i) the global system  Σ is 
formalized by a group G, and (ii) the partial  systems Σi, Σj , … of  Σ  are  formalized by groups  Gi, 
Gj , … being subgroups of  G, since any subgroup  Gi,  Gj , … of  G conserves identically over its 
domain the properties it shares with G.
This first – and elementary –  point is not the only one which denotes the essential role group theory 
plays in physics. There are others.
3.2 Idealization
Of course, physical laws are idealization. It would be highly improbable that we find in the physical 
reality some phenomenon expressing the corresponding physical law in its purest state. According 
to certain voices,  physics is “just idealization”, or “only idealization.”
In fact,  the very possibility of  idealization in  physics  represents,  epistemologically speaking,  a 
unique situation and explains in turn a good part of the epistemic power distinguishing physics from 
any other science.
Concerning physics,  idealization  consists at least in a first approximation of  the suppression of 
physical  factors  which  –  being  contingent  or  not  –  dismiss  the  actual  “behavior”  of  a  given 
phenomenon from the law describing it “theoretically.” Here below, you find  a little more technical 
and so a little more exact approach of idealization. If you prefer skip this passage, please retain in 
the  preceding  sentence  the  noun  “suppression.”  We  will  have  to  come  back  to  the  notion  of 
suppression after the following technical note.
Let  us admit that a physical phenomenon   e  is expressed – in a pertinent way  or not  (see below) –  by a 
mathematical  entity   P(e)  taking  the  form  Pi(xi)  =  φi(...,  xj ,  …),  i,j  =  1,  ...  n,m.   Measuring  empirically 
the phenomenon  e,  we  will  find  in  most  cases  for  each  e i, ej   a higher or lower deviation  Δxi,  Δxj, … 
from the theoretical values  xi,  xj  …  Now, idealization  consists  among  other  of  the  suppression of factors 
supposed to play an effective role concerning the gap  Δxi,  Δxj, …  between the theoretical  xi,  xj  …  and their 
empirical  measures.   These  factors  can  be  frictions,  diverse  kinds  of  energy  loss  and  so  on.  Note that  
idealization also can comprise  the passage of “very large” values to infinity and analogous choices, but a more 
detailed approach of this point  would  lead  us  too  far. Anyway, the suppression of friction and so on eventually 
completed  by other  choices  implies  ipso  facto  corrections    δxi, δxj, …  rectifying  as  well  as  possible  the 
( xi  + Δxi), (  xj  + Δxj), …  in  form  of   (  xi  + Δxi +δxi), (  xj  + Δxj +δxj), … Of course, despite these corrections 
δxi, δxj, … , we generally do not obtain ( xi + Δxi +δxi) =  xi, ( xj + Δxj +δxj) =  xj, …  as the corresponding law P(e) 
predict  it. Indeed, the gaps Δxi,  Δxj, … result not only from in principle corrigible parasite factors such as friction 
and so on, but also from experimental errors and/or measurement problems. But if  the sufficiently often repeated 
experiment makes tend the ( xi + Δxi +δxi), ( xj + Δxj +δxj), …  to the  limits xi, xj, … predicted by the law P(e),  the 
idealization in question is operating and so validates at least in a given context the  law P(e) we initially qualified 
as not necessarily pertinent.
In fact, it is more complicated. Norton advances an exceptionally exhaustive analysis of idealization in physics, 
distinguishing above all “idealization” and “approximation” (Norton, 2011,pp.3 ff.; pp.6 ff.). Nevertheless, the 
foregoing gives us the the essential minimum we need in this little paper. 
Now, whether we skipped the (a bit more) technical note or not, we have to retain the following 
point. Consisting –  among others – of the suppression of certain undesirable factors, idealization is 
a manner of putting the corresponding phenomenon out of its global context. In subsection 3.1 we 
had specified that this way of proceeding generally led to intrinsic distortion. However, within the 
investigation field of physics, idealization, far from leading to distortion,  extracts physical laws 
from their disturbing context  by setting invariant limits to experimental fluctuations. 
Since only mathematical groups admit a distortion-free partial investigation of related factors, the 
fundamental role of physical idealization is in  turn an expression of the group-theoretic foundations 
of   physics.
Note that a more rigorous  group-theoretic approach of idealization obviously would require the 
recourse to renormalization groups. We will effectively evoke the notion of renormalization group 
in  subsection  3.33,  but  deepening  the  links  between  renormalization  and  physical  idealization 
would overload this paper. 
3.3 Touching on other group-theoretic roots of physics 
3.31 Paradigm shifts and unity of physics:  Approaching the issue of paradigm shifts, we can 
literally retake the group-theoretic considerations we advanced in subsection 3.1 about distortion-
free partial approaches. Nevertheless, we have to distinguish the  “classical” and the “non-classical” 
conception paradigm shifts. According to the  “classical” conception,  the occurrence of a  new 
paradigm implies the transition from the ancient theory  Ti  to a larger theory Ti+1  so that  Ti ⊂  Ti+1. 
The foregoing  seems trivial, but  it  is  not  so. Within  the  expression “Ti ⊂  Ti+1”, Ti  appears  as a 
partial consideration of  Ti+1. Instead of being a particular case of  Ti+1,  Ti  in principle should be 
affected by  distortion, constituting a foreign body within Ti+1. Since in physics – at least in the part 
of physics where the “classical” view of paradigm shifts is pertinent (see below) – the transition 
from  Ti   to   Ti+1  conserves  Ti  in  a  distortion-free  way,  the  concerned  domain  necessarily 
is  formalizable  in  terms  of  appropriated  mathematical  groups.  More   generally,  for  a  series  
of  “classical”  paradigm  shifts  implying  the  corresponding  theory  transitions   Ti → Tj so  that 
j  > i ⇒ Ti ⊂  Tj, there must be for any i, j, …   a group Gj  formalizing Tj so that Gi as a subgroup of 
Gj  formalizes Ti. The standard example of “classical” paradigm shifts consists of the transition from 
Newtonian  mechanics  to  SR,  and from SR to RG, the  Galileo  group being a  subgroup of  the 
Lorentz-Poincaré group, whereas the latter is a local case of RG-manifolds. But now we have to 
recall that the “classical” paradigm shift schema does not cover the general case of paradigm shifts. 
With  regard  to  quantum physics,  reducing  the  Planck  constant  h to  zero  certainly  allows  the 
derivation of the current macro-physical laws, but this is not sufficient to say that macro-physics is 
just a particular case of quantum physics according to the“classical” schema  Ti ⊂  Tj. (D'Ariano, 
2015,  pp.1f.)  All  these  endless  more  or  less  speculative  controversies  revolving  around  wave 
function  collapse,  decoherence, Everett parallel universes generation and so on are the expression 
of an emergence problem between the quantum and macro scales (see Landsman, 2005, passim). If 
in this case we want to conserve the schema Ti ⊂  Tj, its “classical” interpretation in terms of “one” 
theory included in “one” other broader theory is too reducing. In  Ti ⊂  Tj, at least  Tj,  must be 
reinterpreted as an “inter-theoretic construction” consisting on several theories … Tjr,  Tjs, … being 
related. Note that for reasons of generality, it is better to consider  Ti in turn as an “inter-theoretic 
construction” on the basis of related theories … Tiu,  Tiv, … , without excluding the particular case of 
a  homogenous  Ti.  But  what  could  we understand  by inter-theoretic  constructions  consisting  of 
“related theories”? There is doubtlessly an infinity of possibilities to “relate” theories being perhaps 
very different  per se.  However, we certainly cannot admit  just any  manner to relate theories in 
order to obtain a whole supposed to belong to physics. A relatively intuitive way to delimit inter-
theoretic constructions consistent with physics is – at least indirectly – given by Butterfield's Nagel-
inspired  approach of  the emergence  issue.  (Butterfield,  2013,  pp.6 ff.;  Butterfield and Bouatta, 
2013, pp.     37 ff.) Recall that according to “reductionism”, complex phenomena can be “reduced” 
to more fundamental ones. So, for “physical reductionism”, or “physicalism”, any phenomenon is 
ultimately reducible to physical phenomena. Now, other voices assert that there are phenomena 
which are not reducible to physics. From this standpoint, and referring to physics, these phenomena 
are “emergent”, i.e.  they exist but we cannot not really explain by the sole laws of physics where 
they  come  from.  Emergence  is  the  subject  of  endless  debates.  The  reference  paper  of  Paul 
Humphreys  (Humphreys, 1997), the response to Humphreys by Frederick Kronz and  Justin Tiehen 
(Kronz and Tiehen, 2002), or, in another register, the critical overview of Peter Corning (Corning, 
2002) reveal the “infinite” complexity of this issue. On the one hand, emergence, since it carries a 
substantial dose of epistemological fragility, does not seem to be very popular among physicists. On 
the  other  hand,  it  would  it  be  rather  dogmatic  to  retain  physical  reductionism  unreservedly. 
Butterfield, while recognizing that physical reductionism in its “classical” form obviously raises 
serious problems, advances following Nagel the possibility to redefine physical reductionism in an 
inter-theoretic way. Complex phenomena  effectively are irreducible to physical theories as they 
have  traditionally  been  developed  through  last  centuries,  could  be  reduced  to  inter-theoretic 
constructions elaborated on the base of physical theories. In fact, the formulation “on the basis of 
physical theories” is not very pertinent, and in a following more technical note we will precise why. 
But for the moment, let us admit this formulation, considering such an inter-theoretic construction 
Tj we suppose obtained “on the basis”  of theories  …  Tjr ,  Tjs , …  ,  Tju ,  Tjv, … To escape the 
problem of a too extensive conception of inter-theoretic constructions, Butterfield, following Nagel, 
impose the constraint that the theories   …  Tjr ,  Tjs , …  ,  Tju ,  Tjv, … must be related by “bridge 
laws”, “bridge principles” or “correspondence rules” relevant to these theories, without necessarily 
belonging to them. (For more details, see Butterfield and Bouatta, 2014, pp. 37 ff.)  Nevertheless, in 
order  to  remain  consistent  with  ourselves,  we  have  to  require  that  within  the  inter-theoretic 
construction Tj, any theory among the  …  Tjr , Tjs , …  , Tju , Tjv, …   can  be  individually  identified. 
If  this  constraint  is  not  satisfied,  we fall  back into emergence physicists  refuses  as  mysticism. 
Indeed, if we conceive  Tj   as an inter-theoretic construction  obtained  “on  the basis” of theories 
…  Tjr ,  Tjs , …  ,  Tju ,  Tjv, … without being able to identify  each Tjg  individually, i.e. separately 
from each Tjh, g ≠ h, our conception  resembles something like “The whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts”, where we recognize the Aristotle-inspired “fundamental postulate” of “general systems 
theory.”  Now,  this  postulate  –  with  some  reservations  concerning  the  term  “sum”  –  is  not 
meaningless,  quite  the  contrary.  Yes,  but  physics  as  such does  not  know what  to  do  with  the 
fundamental postulate of  “general systems theory”, and this exactly for the same reasons which 
make emergence suspect to physics. On the other hand, the individual identification of any Tjg,  Tjh 
within Tj is necessarily a partial consideration of Tj, and so we encounter once again the distortion 
problem intrinsically related  to  partial  considerations.  Subsequently,  a  distortion-free  individual 
identification of any Tjg, Tjh within Tj presupposes the existence of a group Gj  formalizing  Tj  so that 
each  Tjg,  Tjh  is formalized by a group  Gjg,  Gjh  being a subgroup of Gj.  Even if we reinterpret the 
“classical” paradigm shift schema  Ti ⊂  Ti+1  by a “non-classical”  paradigm shift schema where at 
least the theory Ti+1 is in fact an inter-theoretic construction, the group-theoretic constraints we met 
above manifestly are conserved.
A little more technical approach of inter-theoretic constructions confirms the foregoing. 
The formulation “inter-theoretic construction Tj obtained 'on the base' of  theories  …  Tjr , Tjs , …  , Tju , Tjv, … ” 
we used above for evident reasons of simplicity  finally is  not  very  significant. To  obtain  an  appropriated  
inter-theoretic construction, we have to work with intersections  Tjr ∩ Tjs,  unions  Tju ∪ Tjv,   intersections of 
unions (Tjr ∪ Tjs) ∩ (Tju ∪ Tjv), unions of intersections (Tjr ∩ Tjs) ∪ (Tju ∩ Tjv) and so on, where all theses items are 
linked by operations and/or transformations. Now, the idea of intersections, or unions and so on of theories has  
all chances to be problematic. Intersections or unions and so on initially concern sets, whereas the extension of 
these notions to theories – and other forms of organized complexity – generally risks resembling the  non-void 
“intersection” of a bird and a fish consisting of the molecules effectively shared by both. Manifestly, the use of  
set-theoretic operations seems – at least in the general case –  not very appropriate to theories. And yet, there are 
solutions, however affected by highly restrictive constraints. Let us admit that the notion of mathematical structure 
represents the minimal form of organized sets. Since a structure  (S, ⊥)  is a set  S  fitted by any mean ⊥ allowing 
to connect the elements of S  – the symbol   ⊥  can be for an operation, a transformation, an order and so on – set-
theoretic notations such as  (Sjr , ⊥jr )  ∪ (Sjs , ⊥js)     or   ((Sjr , ⊥jr ) ∪ (Sjs , ⊥js )) ∩ ((Sju , ⊥ju ) ∪ (Sjv , ⊥jv )), … …   are 
legitimate,  provided    the  connectors   ⊥gh   go  together without   any  inconsistency.  Excepted simple cases like 
“(Sjr , ⊥) ⊂ (Sjs , ⊥)” where the  same connector  ⊥   is adequately defined over Sjr and Sjs, knowing that Sjr as such 
is effectively included  in  Sjs,  it  is  sometime  hard,  but  not  a priori  impossible  to  satisfy   the   latter 
constraint  for  the  general  case comprising sets  Sjr , Sjs  fitted  with  different connectors ⊥jr , ⊥js.   Setting  for 
example  ⊥j1 ≝ (a+b)(1+c), c ∈ {0,  –1}   and   ⊥j2 ≝  +, while presupposing  that  ⊥j1  and  ⊥j2   are defined 
respectively  over  ℝ   and  ℕ,  there  is   nothing  preventing us  from  writing  correctly  (ℕ, ⊥j2)  ⊂  (ℝ, ⊥j1) or 
(ℕ, ⊥j2)  ∩  (ℝ, ⊥j1) = (ℕ, ⊥j2). 
Now, in physics we need absolutely distortion-free and subsequently reversible structures, knowing that reversible  
structures  are  groups.  On  the  other  hand,  as  everybody knows,  groups  are  particular  cases  of  mathematical 
structures.   All  we said about the general case (S,  ⊥) with regard to the legitimate extension of set-theoretic 
operations required for inter-theoretic constructions, can be repeated for groups, however with a very restrictive  
supplementary constraint: For expressions like  (Sjr , ⊥jr )  ∪ (Sjs , ⊥js) or  (Sjr , ⊥jr )   ⊂  (Sjs , ⊥js) and so on, where 
Sjr, Sjs are groups, to be consistent, the connectors  ⊥jr, ⊥js, …  must in turn belong to corresponding transformation 
groups Gj : ⊥jr  → ⊥js.
So,  provided  the  foregoing  condition  is  satisfied,  the  group-theoretic  foundations  of  physics  represent   the  
common response to the double constraint being related (i) to the necessity of distortion-free partial considerations  
and (ii) to the in turn necessary extension of set-theoretic operations to inter-theoretic constructions.
3.32 Group theory  and symmetry  breaking: Touching upon other  aspects  of  group-theoretic 
foundations of physics, we also have to consider a case  which apparently contradicts the foregoing, 
or at least could potentially generate serious misunderstandings.  
The language of  physics,  in first  approximation,  denotes by “symmetry” all  characteristics of 
physical  systems  which  are  formalizable  by mathematical groups. Now there are  numerous 
physical systems –  from macro- to subatomic physics –  which are the support of  “symmetry 
breaking.” This latter term is not without ambiguity (Castellani, 2002, p.1). “Symmetry breaking” 
could – but please pay attention to the  conditional –  suggest the idea of a passage from symmetry 
to asymmetry,  i.e. a  transition  V → non-V.  Now  we  have  defined  irreversibility by  the same 
expression V → non-V. (See section 2) At first glance, this definition – but once again, we use the 
conditional  –  could   imply  an   insalubrious  consequence:  “Irreversibility” and “symmetry 
breaking”  are   synonyms.  Trying to  show that  physics  is  essentially based on group-theoretic 
foundations,  we apparently encounter  substantial  troubles,  since symmetry breaking phenomena 
seem to undermine physics by “non-group theory.”
In fact,  symmetry break is  not the passage from symmetry to asymmetry.  Moreover,  symmetry 
break theory  does  belong to advanced group theory. Such as it has been formulated in a very 
adequate way by Elena Castellani, “(...) the situation where this symmetry is broken is characterized 
by a lower symmetry than the situation where this  symmetry is  not broken. In  group-theoretic 
terms,  this means that the initial symmetry group is broken into one of its subgroups. It is therefore 
possible to describe symmetry breaking in terms of relations between transformation groups, in 
particular between a group (the unbroken symmetry group) and its subgroup(s).” (Castellani, 2002, 
p.2; my own emphasis; comp. Yanofsky and Selcer, 2013, p. 6). Here we recognize spontaneously  a 
possible interpretation – not  the  unique  one, but  a  possible  interpretation among others – of the 
principal constraint striking inter-theoretic constructions  Tj which, to belong to physics, must be 
formalizable in terms of a group  Gj  specifying  the  Klein  V-group, so  that  each  inter-theoretic 
component Tjk of Tj is  formalizable by a sub-group Gjk, Gjk ⊂ Gi. 
3.33  Renormalization and renormalization groups:  Contemporary  physics  would  not   be 
imaginable without renormalization.  Initially conceived as an purely heuristic  tool  (Butterfield, 
2013, pp. 10 ff.)  supposed  to  master “as well as possible” some inextricable problems emanating 
for example from  too-high  energies  inaccessible  to  experimental  means,  renormalization  is 
nowadays an intrinsic part  of  the  conceptual  edifice  of advanced physics, modifying – among 
other  things  –  what  epistemology  traditionally  meant  by  objectivity  and  subjectivity  (comp. 
Lesne,1999,  p. 4; comp. Butterfield, 2013, pp. 10 ff.), playing  doubtlessly  a  significant  role 
concerning the  epistemic shift  which seems to be coming on the horizon.  In our  context,  the 
technical nature of renormalization  has  a  deep  sense.  In  a first  approximation,  renormalization 
consists  of the “amputation”  within  a model  supposed  to  represent a physical phenomenon, of 
certain factors leading to  undesirable  situations  like “infinite  quantities of  energy” or  senseless 
expressions such as ∞/∞ and so on.
Now – our discourse becomes routine –  an amputated model of a given phenomenon in the general 
case would  be  distorted.   Such  distorted  models would have condemned renormalization to 
remain a purely heuristic approach. However, this is not the case. In its own way, renormalization 
leads to a new kind of distortion-free exactitude. Below, a little note furnishes you some  details. 
But anyway, the distortion-free aspect of renormalization advocates in turn group-theoretic founda-
tions of  physics.
Following A. Lesne (Lesne, 1999), let us try to identify the epistemological interest of renormalization through a  
current example on quantum field theory encountering the very high energy problem. The first step in any QFT 
approach is necessarily the adoption of a model M of the physical system to be investigated. But immediately a 
first difficulty  arises. On the one hand, absolutely speaking, there is no objective factor justifying any upper limit  
of the model M with regard to the energies/frequencies engaged within the system to be modeled; so we  adopt  an 
initial model  without  an  upper limit we note M∞ . On the other hand, the model M∞  is necessarily  distorted. Our 
experimental   knowledge  about  the  very  high  energies/frequencies  is  absolutely  insufficient,  and  even  non- 
existent.   The model  M∞   consists  merely of an extrapolation of phenomena known up to arbitrarily large 
frequencies and wave vectors. Note MΩ  any model with an  upper limit  Ω of frequencies and  characterized by 
parameters θR(Ω)  we  qualify  as  “parameters fixed according to  Ω .”  Beyond MΩ,   M∞   expresses so-called  “ul-
tra-violet  divergences”  designating not  a serious disturbance of the system  to describe, but merely the  dubious  
adequacy  as such of   M∞   regarding  the  description of  the system in question  when the  limitation  Ω of 
energies/frequencies  is  violated.  (comp. Lesne, 1999, p. 4).  For   its  part,  MΩ     escapes  the  “ultraviolet 
divergences”,  since by construction, MΩ  takes into account exclusively frequency phenomena ω such as  |ω| < Ω, 
whereas  for  |ω| > Ω,  all  phenomena  ω  related  to  the  “parameters  fixed according to  Ω ”  we noted here 
above   “θR(Ω)”   become  the  object  of  conjectures.  If  we  now  consider  a  series  of  upper  limits 
… ,Ωi, … Ωj, … , j > i , then there is no objective reason to privilege any framework θR(Ωi) over  any other θR(Ωj). 
From  a “classical” viewpoint, here, seen from a “'pre-renormalization' viewpoint”,  any  choice  Ωi   represents  an 
approximation  to    Ωj,  j > i,  while  all  choices … ,Ωi, … Ωj, …  fall globally under subjectivity.  (comp. Lesne, 
1999, p. 4) m
It  is  however  precisely  at  this  level  that  renormalization  expresses  a  deep perspective shift. Indeed, some  
relations between  the choices  Ωi,  Ωj,  can lead to intrinsic properties of the system. This becomes effectively 
possible, if  there  is  a  transformation RΩi,Ωj  determining  the modeling change  MΩi  → MΩj  when we pass from 
Ωi to  Ωj, i ≠ j, with the two  additional conditions (i)  that   RΩi,Ωj  constitutes  necessarily a distortion-free one-to-
one relation between  the  (Ωi, Ωj)  and  the  (MΩi, MΩj), and (ii) that for any i,j, the properties of R are conserved for 
(MΩi, M*), where M* is the model  corresponding  to  a  given  “critical point”  not  to  be  exceeded.   If (!)  such 
a   relation  RΩi,Ωj  :  MΩi  →  MΩj    exists,  let  us  call  it  the  renormalization of MΩj    by  MΩi.  Now,   it  is 
clear  that  to  be able  to   link  in  a  distortion  free way   any  MΩi , MΩj  in both senses  RΩi,Ωj : MΩi  →  MΩj  and 
RΩj,Ωi  : MΩj  →  MΩi ,  the  set  of all models  … MΩi , … MΩj …  defined through      their respective  upper  limits 
… ,Ωi, … Ωj, …  have  to  be the support of a transformation group (Ω, R) we call  “renormalization group.” (Also 
comp. Reutlinger, 2014, pp.10 ff.)   
Since  experience  denotes  that  there  are   effectively  renormalization  groups  being  suitable  for  a   vast 
range of  essentially  different   physical  systems  going  from  QED,  QFT or  QCD  to  absolutely  tangible 
fields  like  polymerization (Lesne, 1999, p. 5), renormalization  contributes a major part to the emergence in  
physics of a new kind of  immaterial  second  order  objectivity (comp. Butterfield, 2013, pp. 10 ff.)  expressing 
perhaps  some aspects of an epistemic shift  seeming to be in the air.  But  there  are  also  good  chances  to see  
renormalization groups ensure the unity of physics beyond the  unprecedented upheavals physics  probably will  
have encountered in the very near future.
3.4   A first recapitulation 
Physics  is  possible  because  there  is   an  investigation  field consisting on phenomena being 
formalizable  in  the  way we  describe  here above.  The  existence  of   such   phenomena is not  
self-evident. On the contrary, the very fact that there are phenomena formalizable in terms of G and 
constituted by sub-phenomena formalized by Gi, Gj , …  so that  Gi  ⊂ G, Gj  ⊂ G, …  represents the 
essential part of the “infinite” improbability separating the investigation field of physics from what 
does not belong to it.
Since  the  investigation  field  of  physics  implies  phenomena which are  formalizable  in  terms of 
group-theory – with the notable and necessarily problematic exception of the so-called “physical” 
irreversibility  (see below) – the  non-formalizability  of  a given phenomenon in terms of group 
theory is – but once again  we  have  to  insist  on the presence of an undesirable exception  – 
incompatible  with  the  belonging of the phenomenon in question to  the investigation  field  of  
physics. Subsequent  to  the  “infinite”  improbability  separating  the  investigation  field   of 
physics  from  what  does  not  belong  to  it, the  separation  between  physics  and non-physics 
is   very  sharp.  Certainly,  we can find outside of physics phenomena being group-theoretically 
formalizable, however, in this case group-theory is not necessarily among the foundations of the 
corresponding scientific edifice.
Time  is  an  essential dimension within physics. But since all physical dimensions,  comprising 
time, are covered by  group-theoretic  structures, physics  –  apart from the above mentioned excep-
tion –   is intrinsically atemporal. 
4. Physical atemporality v/s Bergsonian temporality                         
Following  the  foregoing,  the   group-theoretically  formalizable  and  subsequently  atemporal 
investigation field of physics is embedded  in a world submitted to temporality. On the other hand,  
physics, for identical group-theoretic reasons, is  simultaneously  characterized by its “infinitely” 
high  improbability  and  its  more  than  astonishing  epistemic power, notably  with  regard  to 
prediction, and more precisely to symmetry between prediction and retro-diction. For  the same 
reasons, it is “infinitely” improbable that other sciences with their respective investigation fields 
could  reach  an  epistemic  power  comparable  to  that  of  physics. Now – once again, please pay  
attention  to  the conditional –  if such a choice  were  possible, it would be pleasant for  scientific 
activities outside of physics to “import” from the latter its functioning mode. But this  is  not  the 
case.  Any  tentative  to transpose  physics  to  non-physics unavoidably  leads  to  a  clash  between 
group-theoretic  atemporality  and the temporality characterizing all that which does not belong to 
the investigation field of physics.  
The  foregoing  represents   a   major   problem   for  contemporary  philosophy  beginning with 
physics itself when it has to integrate irreversibility, and continuing in all fields where something 
equivalent to the epistemic power of physics is felt to be missing.
4.1 Irreversibility and its generalization
In  section 1,   we  had identified  reversibility  as   the  conservation   by  a   given  system 
of   its   functioning   mode   through   change,   shorthanding    “functioning  mode of a system Σ” 
by “fm(Σ)”, “the  conservation of fm(Σ)  by an  ideally reversible   system   Σ”  by “(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)”, 
and “irreversibility” by  “(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct).” Within the latter expression, the term 
“fm(Σ) ⇒ ct”  at  the  left  of  the  transition  arrow is  absolutely necessary to  denote  an  essential  
problem concerning irreversibility: handbook chapters supposed to characterize irreversibility as a 
phenomenon de facto use formulations resembling the following: “The  motion of all  molecules 
constituting an initially ordered gas contained within an enclosure is  'in principle'  governed by 
reversible Newtonian mechanics. So, the gas in question evolving with time  theoretically should 
return  its  initial  ordered  state,  whereas  'in  fact'  we  always  observe  a  transition  from order  to 
disorder.” So, irreversible  transitions necessarily contain at least implicitly the term “fm(Σ) ⇒ ct”. 
In  section  1.  we  saw that  irreversibility,  far  from being  the  direct  negation  of  reversibility,  is 
undermining    ideally  reversible  systems,  or  superposed  to  them,  if  you  prefer.  Indeed,  the 
current  interpretation  of   “(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)”   in terms of a transition from 
order  to  disorder  as  it  occurs  in  physics is  just  a  particular  possibility  among  an  infinity  of 
essentially  different  potential  interpretations.   First,   recall   that  in  the  physical  translation  of 
“(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)”, i.e. the Clausius formula ΔS  ≥  0 – or rather the Clausius 
formulation?  –  the entropy S has the dimension of an energy. Now let us shuffle a card pack being 
initially ordered  in  some way.  Here  again,  the  variation  of  the  internal state  of  the  card  pack 
consists of an irreversible transition from order to disorder, however without implying any energy 
dimension, since this process can be described for example in terms of the physically dimensionless 
Shannon entropy. Manifestly, irreversibility does not exclusively concern physics, unless we want 
to qualify as “physics” everything and its opposite. 
Now,  there  is  a  more  important  point  to  consider.  Formally speaking,  the  non-conservation  of 
(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct),  beyond  the   usual  interpretation  of  “(fm(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ)  ⇒ ct)”  as  the 
transition  from order to disorder, can  also  take  the  form  of  a  transition,  for  the  system Σ, 
from  a  given  functioning mode  fm  to  another one which  we will note  for  the  moment fm'. 
Provided both fm and fm' are constant during certain time intervals, this kind of non-conservation of 
fm(Σ) can be written “(fm(Σ) ⇒ ct)  →  (fm'(Σ) ⇒ ct)”, knowing that the latter expression, by its 
nature, is to be generalized to   “…, (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct)   →   (fmi+1(Σ) ⇒ ct), …,   (fmj(Σ) ⇒ ct) → 
→ (fmj+1(Σ) ⇒ ct), …” That being said,  there  is, at a purely formal level,  no  intrinsic reason  to 
exclude a priori  the possibility  that  some transitions (fmu(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmu+1(Σ) ⇒ ct), transpose 
the system from a lower organization state fmu(Σ)  to a higher one fmu+1(Σ).
The foregoing  obviously leads to a well known problem. On the one hand, “current” irreversibility 
expressed  by  (fm(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → non-(fm(Σ)  ⇒ ct)  is  just  a  special  case  of  the  more  general 
formulation  …,  (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct), …, (fmj(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmj+1(Σ) ⇒ ct), … On the 
other hand, the general formulation comprises transitions (fmu(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmu+1(Σ) ⇒ ct) increasing 
the  organization  of   the  system  Σ, as   it  is  currently observed  in  biology,  while  “current” 
irreversibility  attributes  exactly  to  this  kind of  transitions  (fmu(Σ) ⇒ ct) →  (fmu+1(Σ) ⇒ ct) 
“infinitely” high  improbabilities, so that these transitions – de facto – never occur.
How can it be possible that something  current in biology is  currently to be excluded in physics? 
Unless  we  blindly  admit  in  the  field  of  biological  evolution  the  occurrence  of  quasi  infinite 
improbabilities we never would envisage in physics – no physical theory holding only in the case 
that “very improbable but not impossible” things like water freezing on on a heat source  actually 
occur,  would be taken seriously by  physicists,  while in the area of biological evolution, certain 
theories  seem to consider  the occurrence  of  equivalent  improbabilities  as  something absolutely 
normal – we have to recognize that the general case of transitions going from lower to higher order 
as well from higher to lower  carry a great epistemological malaise.
In fact, there is a big problem hampering knowledge acquisition in many various fields. But there is 
no intrinsic inconsistency, as we will see  here below. 
4.2  Non-group-theoretic formalizability beyond group-theoretic physics           
4.21 Formal considerations
The general formulation …, (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct), …, as we saw it above, admits  both 
particular cases consisting  of the transition within Σ (i) from higher to lower and (ii) from lower to 
higher organization. But, contrarily to appearances,  the problem does not concern the opposition 
between that what we call currently “physical” irreversibility and what we observe  in  some fields 
like  biology. The  real problem lies on the side of the insurmountable abyss separating what is 
formalizable in terms of group theory and what   is  not.  The expression  fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct is  a  non-
sufficient but absolutely necessarily precondition for the belonging of Σ to the investigation field of 
physics. So, supposing that Σ effectively belongs to the investigation field of physics, any transition 
of the kind (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct) belongs in turn to the the investigation field of physics 
if and only if it is intrinsically formalizable in terms of a mathematical group. In other words, the 
transition in question must emanate from a transformation group  GΣ  transforming    fm(Σ) ≡ fmi(Σ) 
into fmi+1(Σ) formalized respectively by the groups Gi and Gi+1, so that Gi ⊂ GΣ  and Gi+1 ⊂ GΣ.  This 
is not the case for irreversibility, nor for systems whose organization state increases at least during a 
certain  time  interval,  as  it  is  observed  in  biology.  With  regard  to  irreversibility,  the  foregoing 
proposals are easy to prove: the transition from a given initial state of Σ characterized by an ideally 
constant fmi(Σ) to its simple non-existence merely dispenses us  from asking the question whether 
the final state of Σ is formalizable in terms of a group Gi+1,  so that Gi ⊂ GΣ . Concerning the kind of 
biological systems interesting us here, we obtain an analogous result,  operating  by  reductio ad 
absurdum. Imagine such a system  by a series of  transitions …, (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ) ⇒ ct), … 
… (fmj(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmj+1(Σ) ⇒ ct),”, where each …, fmi(Σ), fmi+1(Σ), (fmj(Σ), (fmj+1(Σ), …  supposed 
constant over a given time interval denotes a step in the development or evolution of the system in 
question. Now let us admit (i) that there are for any transition  (fmi(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ) ⇒ ct)  two 
groups  Gi, Gi+1, formalizing respectively (fmi(Σ), (fmi+1(Σ), and (ii) that there is a group GΣ,  so  that 
Gi  ⊂  GΣ   and  Gi+1 ⊂  GΣ.  If this  is  the  case, then  all the  … Gi, Gi+1, ,Gj, Gj+1, …  are included in 
GΣ. In other words, there is a global group GΣ  covering all the development  or evolution of   the 
system  Σ  which  is  subsequently  governed  by  a  global  fm(Σ) ⇒ ct, whereas not only the diverse 
… fmi(Σ), fmi+1(Σ), … (fmj(Σ), (fmj+1(Σ)  but also their corresponding transitions fmi(Σ) → fmi+1(Σ), … 
(fmj(Σ)  →  (fmj+1(Σ) are  distortion-free  partial  considerations of  the  system  Σ.  Obviously,  the 
possibility of  such  distortion-free  partial  considerations of  the  system  Σ is  based  on  the 
atemporality of  Σ expressed by fm(Σ) ⇒ ct, but the atemporality of Σ contradicts by definition its 
development or evolution. 
Of course, the latter point is subject to diverse speculations. We will come back to this point. For the 
moment we have to conclude that the common denominator of irreversibility and its  extensions 
comprising the possibility of increasing order and even increasing organization consists of their 
non-formalizability in terms of mathematical groups, where the transition from order to disorder is 
just a special case.
4.22 “Physical” irreversibility belonging to the periphery of physics
Now, there seems to be a potential objection:  If, to belong to the investigation field of physics, a 
given  phenomenon  has  to  satisfy  the  non-sufficient  but  absolutely  necessary  precondition  of 
formalizability in terms of group theory, then “physical irreversibility” cannot be “physical.” While 
the  idea  that  biology  is  not  “just  a  part  of  physics”  can  at  least  be  defended  against  ultra-
reductionists thinking the opposite,  denying the physical status of irreversibility would be a manner 
of catapulting out of physics the second law of thermodynamics. Well,  this issue is thorny. We 
cannot simply brush it aside. But we also have to recall that irreversibility – sometime formalizable 
in  terms  of  the  physically  dimensionless  Shannon entropy or  something analogous  –  does  not 
necessarily manifest itself within physics. So, the correct formulation of the issue we are tackling 
here  is  the  following:   is  irreversibility  an   essentially  physical  phenomenon  having  its 
consequences  or  applicability  outside  physics,  just  like  for  example  pressure  or  low  current 
electricity  which  also  intervene  in  biology?  Or  is  irreversibility  an  a  priori non-physical 
phenomenon invading physics where it is playing the disturbing role of a foreign body? The second 
option seems to be the more adequate. Irreversibility is undermining ideally reversible   physical 
laws,  whereas  nobody  would  have  the  idea  to  say  that  ideally  reversible  physical  laws  are 
undermining  irreversibility.  Thanks  to  the  highly exceptional  group-theoretic  foundations  of  its 
investigation field, physics is able  to idealize experimental data by purifying them in a distortion-
free  way of irreversibility-generating factors. It is literally a miracle that distortion-free physics is  
possible despite  irreversibility. 
Certainly, irreversible phenomena occur everywhere in physics, concerning directly macro-physics 
and intervening in subatomic physics  via the essentially macroscopic experimental device. So it 
would not be reasonable to exclude from physics approaches like thermodynamics and/or statistical 
mechanics  insofar as they investigate irreversibility touching directly physical phenomena stricto  
sensu. In other words, there are  aspects of irreversibility we can position in the  periphery of the 
investigation  field  of  physics.  However,  irreversibility  as  such does  not  satisfy  the  essentially 
group-theoretic  precondition for being a physical phenomenon stricto sensu as we defined it at the 
beginning of section 3.
The latter proposals may cause vehement protests. But think of the discussion on the de facto status 
of irreversibility which – implying the great and greatest names of physics and/or philosophy like 
Boltzmann himself, Maxwell,  Loschmidt,  Zermelo, Carnap,  Grünbaum, Popper, Watanabe, Costa 
de Beauregard and others – had caused a lot of ink to flow. If the de facto or “fact-like” status of 
irreversibility must be opposed to the  de iure  or “law-like” status of physical reversibility,  it  is 
because a group-theoretically founded law-like physics does not have the tools to treat non-group-
theoretic  irreversibility,  whereas  among  the  other  sciences  working  precisely  in  fields  not 
formalizable  by group theory,  no one until  further notice reached something equivalent to the 
epistemic power emanating from the group-theoretic foundations of physics.
So, there is not a great difference between irreversibility stricto sensu and systems tending to higher 
organization as they are investigated for example by biology. Of course, irreversibility is “familiar” 
to us, but “familiarity” is not an explanation, and any tentative to explain irreversibility encounters 
the  same  difficulties  as  explanations  of  systems  tending  to  a  higher  degree  of  order:  group-
theoretically founded physics by definition cannot master transitions which are not transformation 
groups, whereas outside physics – at the risk of repeating ourselves – there is nothing equivalent 
with regard to the  epistemic power  physics manifests in its area. 
Or,  perhaps  there  is a  nuance between current  “physical”  irreversibility and biological  systems 
evolving from lower to higher order. Not being able to explain “physical” irreversibility by its own 
means,  i.e.  by  its  specific laws,  physics  at  least  tries  to  elucidate  irreversibility  by  imported 
probabilist  approaches  without  any  physical  specificity.  Indeed,  unlike  quantum  probabilities 
determined by the reversible Schrödinger equation, the probabilist approaches supposed to elucidate 
irreversibility have nothing specific compared to those we use for non-physical processes like the 
drawing of white or black balls from an urn, or roulette and so on. By contrast, trying to resolve  
issues concerning evolving biological systems  by specifically physical  means, all we could expect 
from current probabilist approaches would be a finding of hopelessness.  
Anyway,  the  problem  we  are  facing  does  not  consist  specifically of  the  opposition  between 
reversibility and irreversibility.  The real  cleavage splitting the acquisition of knowledge in  two 
irreconcilable  parts  consists  of the insurmountable gap separating atemporal investigation fields 
being essentially formalizable in terms of group theory and the rest  of the universe necessarily 
marked by temporality.
5. Spatialization of time revisited   
5.1 A contemporary version of reductive “time spatialization” 
As  indicated  shortly in the introduction of this paper,  “spatializing time” according to Bergson 
means  –  in  our  contemporaneous  terminology  (see  subsection  0.1)  –   “confusing  time and 
duration”, knowing that duration – always in our contemporaneous terminology – is the length of 
an open, semi-open or closed interval determined by two time measures ta and tb. Obviously, time 
and duration are not the same thing. And yet, confusing time and duration is current. How to explain 
this confusion?
In fact, there is  not systematically confusion, but the passage from physics with its highly special  
and “infinitely” improbable investigation field to  non-physics can  generate the kind of confusion  
Bergson rightly criticizes. Let us try to elucidate this point.
If a given ta, tb, or whatever is chosen to be the temporal origin reference t0 of an appropriated 
coordinates system, then time intervals delimited  by t0  and any t  can be  expressed by the sole 
t  which  becomes  a  parameter or  a  variable among n  – 1  other  parameters  or  variables   of  a 
n-dimensional  metrical  space.  Now,  whereas  from a  purely  mathematical  standpoint,  there  is, 
absolutely speaking,  no reason to  privilege  within  a  metric  space  one  given dimension among 
others,  things  are  slightly different  from  a  physical standpoint,  but  nothing  more.  In  the  SR 
Minkowski space-time, the irreducibility of the time dimension to the spatial dimensions and vice 
versa  is expressed  by  the  signature  of  the metric taking  indifferently one of both forms (+ – – –) 
or  ( – – – +)  conserving each one the invariance of spatial-temporal distances under the Lorentz-
Poincaré group which, just as any other physically significant  group is ipso facto symmetrical with 
regard to prediction and retro-diction. Concerning RG-manifolds where the Minkowski metric has 
only an infinitesimal validity, or extensions of the Minkowski metric to more abstract spaces with in 
some cases a higher number of dimensions, there is always the same principle: (i) time, in physical 
edifices, does belong to mathematical spaces; featuring a particular status, the time dimension has 
an  impact  on  the  non-temporal  dimensions  and  vice  versa.  (ii)  All the  mathematical  spaces  in 
question being  group structures specifying ultimately the Klein  V-group formalizing in turn the 
conservation of fm(Σ), they describe despite  their irreducible time dimension essentially atemporel 
phenomena. (iii) Point (ii) is not paradoxical because of the effective existence of an investigation 
field consisting of phenomena being formalizable in terms of group theory. 
But recall that consequently to the “infinite” improbability characterizing the  investigation field of 
physics, its effective existence is highly exceptional. Transgressing the well-determined – group-
theoretically-determined  –  boundaries  delimiting  the  investigation  field  of  physics,  any 
spatialization of time falls back into paradox and even absurdity tout court where no logic can be  
found. 
Bergson accuses the general philosophy of his days and of his past to “spatialize” time, i.e. to ignore 
the  specificity of time expressed by the temporality of the world. In our context, we have above all 
to underline that  there are two complementary mistakes to avoid:  (i)  exporting – or importing, if 
you prefer – the group-theoretic foundations of physics beyond the boundaries of the investigation 
field of physics exactly delimited by these foundations, and (ii) forgetting, within physics, these 
group-theoretic foundations and especially the constraints related to them.
The non-respect of this principle leads to speculations immediately shattered by the clash between 
the essentially atemporal foundations of physics and non-physical temporality. 
5.2  The circularity of “physical” chaosogenesis theories
Here is a first example illustrating the foregoing points. Certainly, at first glance, we could believe 
that it is rather a counter-example. But  appearances are deceiving.
Of course, on the one hand, nobody would have the idea to exclude  astrophysics from physics. On 
the other hand, astrophysics, among other tasks, describes the evolution of our universe going from 
less to more organized states, and so from disorder to order. “Common sense”, “intuition” and so on 
could give the impression that  this branch of physics tackles well and truly essentially temporal 
phenomena, confronting this paper with a jolly good dilemma: either we finally have to decree that 
astrophysics does not belong to physics, or all we said about the group-theoretic and subsequently 
atemporal foundations of physics is nonsense. In fact, things are not so simple.
The following example concerning the birth of a star illustrates –  always against “common sense”, 
“intuition”  and  so  on  –  the  necessity  of previously given  order  for  all  pseudo-violation  of 
irreversibility. The contemporary current model concerning the birth of a star advances, roughly 
speaking,  the following scenario:  within a  cosmic cloud of  gas  located in  a  past  we often can 
directly observe, there is initially a permanent struggle between gravity and pressure. Gravity, while 
compressing the gas, also increases its pressure and fosters “despite itself” the dispersion of the 
cloud.  Common sense  often  misleading could  now suggest  a  prolonged  draw. But  a  computer 
simulation (Tegmark, 2014  pp. 38 ff.) taking into account the described situation in the light of  
gravitation  laws  and  physics  of  gas  indicates  a  different  scenario: since  a  good  part  of  heat 
accompanying the pressure ends up being dissipated into space via radiation, gravity sooner or later 
wins, finally generating an overcompression and so a heat overproduction causing the conversion of 
hydrogen into helium. On the other hand, increased gravity definitively prevents the system from 
disintegrating, and a star is about to be born. Obviously the transformation of an informal cosmic 
cloud of gas into a shining star reflects a transition from disorder to more order. But (!!) for the 
Tegmark computer  simulation to  correspond to reality, the gravitation laws as well  as the laws  
governing  physics  of  gas   taken  into  account  by the Tegmark  computer  simulation  had  to  be 
there before the processes  leading to the birth of a new star. Now, physical laws being there before 
given  concrete  phenomena  realize  them  must  be  atemporal,  and  the  possibility  of  seeing  the 
phenomena in question inscribed in a temporal process – as it is obviously the case for the “birth of 
a  star”  –  does  not  change anything  on this  point.  From this  perspective,  temporal  phenomena 
belonging to physics  stricto sensu and not to  its periphery (see subsection 4.22) express in fact 
some deeper atemporality.
Of course, the idea of physical laws which exist before being realized by actual phenomena – the 
correct  philosophical  formulation  would  be  “physical  laws  preceding  ontologically  the  actual 
phenomena  realizing  them” (comp.  Mlika,  2007,  p.  39)  –  joined  to  the  other  idea  of  “deeper 
atemporality”, all this seems very perilously close to metaphysics, or more precisely to Platonism, 
and  Platonism is far from pleasing everyone. But we quickly note that the alternative is even worse.
Provided we are not definitively disgusted by group theory, the foregoing can be specified. Let us represent the  
consecutive process leading to the birth of a star by (fmi(Σ) = ct) → (fmi+1(Σ) = ct) →  (fmi+2(Σ) = ct) → … As we 
saw above, any transition  (fmi+n(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+n+1(Σ) ⇒ ct)   is governed by physical laws known at the moment 
when Tegmark's  computer  simulation was effectuated.  Now, the latter  is  supposed – at  least  supposed –  to 
reproduce  all  the  successive  star generating processes as they produced themselves, and not as things could 
have  occurred   from our standpoint. For this, it  must be possible to consider each (fmi+n(Σ)  ⇒ ct) and each 
(fmi+n(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmi+n+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct) transition in a distortion-free way. In other  words, there  are  two group-
theoretic preconditions to satisfy: (i) Any  fmi+n(Σ) must be formalizable by a group  Gi+n. (ii) For any  fmi+n(Σ), 
fmi+n+1(Σ),  we must  have  fmi+n(Σ)  ⊂  fmi+n+1(Σ).  If  and only if  the preconditions (i)  and (ii)  are satisfied,  the 
transition from any fmi+n(Σ) to fmi+n+1(Σ) is in turn formalizable by a transformation group G: Gi+n → Gi+n+1. Even if 
the temporal dimension intrinsically belongs to the groups in question, the latter express atemporality.
Now there seems to be a serious objection: Concerning the “birth of a star” described by the our general schema  
…  →   (fmi+n(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmi+n+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → … , for any transition (fmi+n(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmi+n+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct) 
effectively observed, we never observe the inverse transition (fmi+n+1(Σ) ⇒ ct) →  (fmi+n(Σ) ⇒ ct).  Although this is 
not a case of irreversibility – recall that irreversibility ultimately means V → non-V – we could suspect that the 
transformations G: Gi+n → Gi+n+1 are semi-groups and not full groups, knowing that the latter satisfy associativity 
completed  by the existence of a neutral and an inverse element or transformation, whereas for semi-groups, only 
associativity is required. Concerning  G: Gi+n → Gi+n+1,  there are apparently just two unsuitable solutions: either 
G:  Gi+n → Gi+n+1 intrinsically has no inverse transformation G:  Gi+n+1 → Gi+n, or the latter does exist on a purely 
mathematical level, without any physical significance. Do both cases not express a kind of temporality?
In fact, it is not so easy. Consider the free fall of a mobile in the gravitation field as it manifests itself in the  
immediate  neighborhood  of  our  earth.  The  movement  of  the  mobile  is  described  by  reversible Newtonian 
mechanics. Nevertheless, without any exterior intervention, the system earth-mobile never returns to its foregoing  
states. And yet, there is no contradiction. The actual “behavior” of the system results from a superposition  of 
ideal reversible physical laws and irreversibility-generating factors we can correct in a distortion-free way by 
idealization  as  we  approached  it  in  subsection  3.2.  The  components  of  the  system earth-mobile  are  neither 
infinitely  elastic,  nor  infinitely  rigid  and  so  on,  whereas  ideally  speaking,  the  phenomenon  in  question  is  
symmetrical  under  prediction  and  retro-diction by  virtue  of  physical  laws  which  do  not  change  over  time. 
Analogously, the birth of a star represents in turn superposition of ideally reversible and so atemporal physical  
laws and irreversibility-generating factors such as heat dissipation in the form of radiation.
Anyway, we have to retain that through the history of the universe, all processes making this history 
are governed by physical laws which must already be there before these processes appear. Certainly, 
as  mentioned  above, such words have metaphysical resonances, but now is the moment to show 
that the alternative does not sound better in the ears of anti-metaphysician physicists.
Let us try (i) to imagine absolute disorder, or chaos, if you prefer, and (ii) admit the impossibility of  
immaterial  physical  laws  preceding  ontologically  the  phenomena  realizing  them.  Well,  since 
manifestly our physical universe is not absolute chaos, there must be a first transition from chaos to 
something which already resembles order. Now we are certainly free to conceive “anyhow” this 
first transition from disorder to order. But if we are interested in the physical universe as such, we 
take ipso facto into account at least the possibility that the disorder → order transition in question is 
governed  by physical  laws.  However,  serious  difficulties  are  rising.  Since  we  have  taken  the 
decision to  play the role  of  visceral  anti-metaphysicians refusing the possibility of  immaterial 
physical laws preceding ontologically the phenomena realizing them, we can choose between only 
two manners to continue. Either we decree that our first disorder → order transition is not governed 
by physical laws, knowing nevertheless that such a choice belongs to the metaphysics we refuse in 
the name of our anti-metaphysical convictions. Or, we claim that some kind of “chaosogenesis” 
simultaneously generates  the disorder  → order  transition interesting us  and  the physical  law(s) 
governing this transition. Alas, our second potential option not only is not less metaphysical than 
the other one,  but still encounters a genuine circularity (comp. Burov and Burov, 2015, pp. 5; 10). 
Indeed, “chaosogenesis” generating  simultaneously disorder → order transitions  and  the physical 
law(s) governing them closely resembles a judge creating him/herself the legislation framing his/her 
verdicts. 
Generally,  physicists  hate  circularity  as  well  as  metaphysics.  But  anyway,  we  have  to  choose 
between the following two options. Either we simply accept that all the processes intervening in the 
history of the physical universe express physical laws which must be there before the processes in 
questions are realized. Perhaps, the atemporality of physical laws belongs to metaphysics.  Or, we 
try to replace this metaphysics by a genuine metaphysical circularity conceived in order to avoid 
metaphysics. Absolutely speaking, each one of us has to make their personal choice.
Now let us return to Bergson. If we merely admit that the birth of a star and any other phenomenon 
belonging to the history of the universe follows physical laws already there, instead of creating ex 
nihilo the laws they follow – it  seems difficult to conceive physics where physical phenomena, 
instead  of  following  physical  laws,  create  them –  then we  have  to  admit  the  existence  of  an 
atemporal framework physics needs for describing this history in terms of atemporality undermined 
by contingency. Probably Bergson never denied the epistemic efficiency of physical atemporality in 
all fields where it is appropriate. 
By contrast, if  we opt for “chaosogenesis” while pretending to remain in the field of physics, we do 
commit  –  rather  uselessly –  the  mistake  which  according  to  Bergson  is  not  to  be  committed: 
applying the  group-theoretic and consequently  atemporal foundations of physics to essentially 
temporal phenomena, we “spatialize time” amputating its temporality. 
Recall that the distortion-free description of a transition (fmi(Σ) ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ) ⇒ ct) presupposes the existence 
of two groups  Gi,  Gi  +1   formalizing respectively  fmi(Σ)  and (fmi+1(Σ), so  that  Gi    ⊂  Gi  +1,  knowing that the 
possibility of such a distortion-free description is the particularity of physics stricto sensu and its group-theoretic 
foundations.   Since  the  satisfaction  of  the  foregoing  precondition  implies  ipso  facto the  existence  of  a 
transformation group   G: Gi → Gi+n, the corresponding transition, beyond its temporal or “historical” aspects, is 
atemporal.
Now interpret  fmi(Σ)  by “chaos” and (fmi+1(Σ) by any phenomenon with a higher degree of order we  suppose 
“chaosogenetical.” Perhaps there is a group Gi+n, formalizing (fmi+1(Σ). But by definition, fmi(Σ) as “chaos” cannot 
be formalized by a group  Gi. So, there is no transformation group  G:  Gi →  Gi+n  where  Gi  would formalize 
(fmi+1(Σ)  within a transition (fmi(Σ)  ⇒ ct) → (fmi+1(Σ)  ⇒ ct) which subsequently does not belongs to physics. 
Pretending the contrary would mean to decree the existence of the non-existing  Gi and  G:  Gi →  Gi+n.  Or, in 
another formulation, specifically we should confuse a situation of irreversibility in a large sense with a symmetry 
breaking  Gi →  Gi+n in  G,  as  we defined  it  following Elena  Castellani  in  subsection  3.32,  knowing that  the 
confusion between symmetry-breaking and irreversibility – generalized or not – represents absolute nonsense. 
From a Bergsonian perspective,  “chaosogenetical”  theories,  via  purely fictitious and even phantasmagorical  
transformation groups ***G: Gi → Gi+n, reduce the essentially temporal idea of a  disorder → order  transition to 
absurd atemporality. 
There is  perhaps  a  latent  temptation to  transpose at  all  costs  atemporal  approaches  proving an 
extraordinary epistemic power within the very improbable and so very restrictive investigation field 
of physics to other fields where they are not at the right place. But it would be hard to conceive such 
temptations satisfying the minimal demand of rigor concerning scientific work.
5.3 “Weak anthropic principle” speculations in the name of physics
The so-called “weak anthropic principle”, its epistemic (?) and or epistemological (?) motivations 
and the deductions WAP is sometime  reputed to found, globally represent another case reducing 
temporality to atemporality as an extension of that what Bergson calls “spatialization of time.”
As such, WAP is merely trivial. Since the homo sapiens sapiens is fitted with a brain able to think of 
her/his place in the physical universe, the latter must have characteristics allowing at least locally 
the progressive emergence of the  homo sapiens sapiens and his/her brain.  This point cannot be 
denied. If the physical universe were incompatible with our apparition within it, we would not be 
here discussing. If despite all, WAP continues to be discussed, it is for contextual reasons. WAP is  
supposed to  reconcile  the actual  apparition of  the  sapiens  with the  “infinite” improbability of 
her/his apparition.
To allow at least locally the emergence of life, humans and above all human brains, the physical 
universe must be “fine-tuned.” If the values of the universal constants were slightly different from 
what they are, we would not be here. How to explain that the universal constants are exactly what 
they have to be? In fact, the problem is still more thorny. To finally realize the conditions required 
for the apparition of humans and human brains, the physical universe must converge through all its 
history to these conditions, and since the history of the universe operates according to physical laws 
and universal constants, it seems at first glance that there is no other solution than to admit that the 
convergence in question is previously programmed, and this from the beginning of the universe and 
even before (comp. Burov and Burov 2015, p.10).
The foregoing obviously suggests or at least risks to suggest Design. Hence great efforts have been 
implemented in order to find philosophically correct alternatives. Since on the one hand, Design 
belongs  to  metaphysics,  and  on  the  other  hand  by  definition any  negation  of  metaphysical 
propositions  represents  –  even  if  visceral  anti-metaphysicians  often  forget  it  –  metaphysical 
propositions, it is foreseeable that  alternatives to Design are not less metaphysical than Design. In 
the context of this paper, we have to add that these mixtures of metaphysics and speculations having 
nothing  in  common with  physics  as  it  is  distinguished from non-physics,  exactly  fall  into  the  
category of reasoning rightly criticized by Bergson.  
Well,  in  our  days  the  classical conception  of  an  almighty chance  randomly underlying  all the 
evolution leading to the apparition of the sapiens-sapiens and her/his brain seems to be abandoned. 
Postulating  such  an improbable configuration of improbabilities exceeds even what is allowed in 
our time where all sorts of speculation are flourishing. So, the multiverse hypothesis could not have 
come up at  a better  time. Indeed,  if beside  our universe, there is an “infinity” – or at  least  an 
unimaginably great number – of “parallel universes”, we can envisage that one among these parallel 
universes, by chance, satisfies in a sufficiently fine tuned way the preconditions for the apparition 
of the sapiens. 
Here, we do not discuss the pertinence of the multiverse hypothesis as such. More especially,  it  
would not be useful to repeat  for the umpteenth time that “parallel universes cannot be observed”, 
that “the hypothesis of their existence is not 'falsifiable' in the sense of Popper” and so on.
Linked  among  other  to  string-theoretic  landscape   being   at  the  present  days  the  object  of 
epistemologically  innovating  interpretations,  the  multiverse  hypothesis  is  philosophically 
interesting. Perhaps, and even probably, physics is at the dawn of a unseen epistemic shift where 
only its group-theoretic foundations will ensure continuity. So, people interested in advanced group 
theory find around the multiverse hypothesis a  fascinating investigation field.
But here, we do not have the place to discuss these points. Let us simply accept the multiverse 
hypothesis as an hypothesis, in order to ask whether the multiverse hypothesis – in case it would be 
true – does resolve the difficulties concerning the fine tuning preconditions for the satisfaction of 
WAP. 
Just as it cannot be proved that a formal system with an “infinity of axioms” would escape the 
Gödel disaster, so also it is perhaps not so sure that an “infinity” of universes comprises necessarily 
a-fine tuned one consistent with WAP. And there are other difficulties. In a now classical text, A. 
Guth, one of the founding fathers of the multiverse approach based on eternal inflation, says that – 
with  the notable exception of  fundamental conservation laws –  “(...) the apparent laws of physics 
at low energies could differ dramatically from one [string theoretic landscape] vacuum to another.” 
(Guth, 2007, p. 10; my own emphasis). Now, on the one hand, any anthropic approach is essentially 
concerned by low energy physics, and on the other hand, that which is true for STL vacua can be 
retaken  for  parallel  universes.  Knowing  that  any  probabilist  consideration  presupposes  the 
comparison of   comparable  elements,  it  is  at  least  disputable whether  a  multiverse  where  the 
apparent laws of physics  at low energies could  differ dramatically from one parallel universe to 
another,  furnishes the appropriate support for the  probabilist  considerations interesting us. Guth 
himself  evokes another problem. Since inflation generates an “infinity” of parallel  universes  Ui 
having  their  corresponding  characteristics  p(Ui),  the  occurrence  of  each  p(Ui)  “will  happen  an 
infinite number of times.”  (Guth, 2008, p. 11) In other words, the probability to find a parallel 
universe  Ui with the characteristics  p(Ui) is equal to  /, which is senseless. Well,  in fact, the 
multiverse does not comprise an  actual infinity of  Ui. At any moment – and let beside the very 
thorny issue concerning the  kind time we should have to evoke: cosmic time (?), meta-cosmic 
time(?), multiversal time (?) or any other ? (comp. Rugh and  Zinkernagel, 2012, pp. 4 ff.)  – the 
multiverse comprises an enumerable finite set  of  Ui increasing  potentially to infinity.  However, 
Guth himself, in his fundamental paper, mentions further complications which even from this at 
least theoretically finite perspective cannot simply be swept away (Guth, 2008, p. 11), and each of 
us is free to subscribe or not to the solutions Guth proposes. But we have to add that, whatever 
could be our choice, Kolmogorov would not be happy at all about any probabilities defined over the 
multiverse.
Kolmogorov, after having admitted “for long time” that (i) “the frequency approach based on the idea of a limiting 
frequency as the number of trials tends to infinity does not give a foundation for the applicability of the results of  
probability theory to practical questions, where we deal with a finite number of trials; [and that] (ii) the frequency 
approach in the case of a large but finite number of trials cannot be developed in a rigorous purely mathematical 
way”, adopted later a more nuanced view of point (ii), while maintaining his position on  point (i). (Kolmogoroff,  
1963, pp.176 f.)  To take account of the fact  that we always deal with a  finite number of trials, we have to 
formulate the law of large numbers in terms of meta-probabilities. Indeed, for a finite number N of trials, the  
difference between the relative frequency n(ei)/N of an event ei and its probability p(ei) cannot be predicted with 
absolute certainty. All we can do is to determine the meta-probability p that this difference, after N trials, is less 
than or equal to ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small real number. If and only if there is a factual probability law p(e) 
over the set  e of events ei which allows us to know  effectively p(ei),  we can express this meta-probability by 
p[n(ei)/N – p(ei) ≤ ε ]. On this basis and introducing a second arbitrarily small real number δ, the law of large 
numbers takes the form  ∀i, ∀(ε, δ), ∃ N0, ∀N ≥  N0,   p[n(ei)/N – p(ei) ≤ ε ]  ≥  (1 – δ).   (Mugur, 2006, pp. 
224 f.).The simple reading of the law of large numbers denotes that the latter, instead of “founding” the factual  
probabilities p(ei), presupposes their given existence in order to acquire significance.
Now, do you see any way to  obtain  a factual  probability law over a multiverse,  and,  on top of that,  over a 
multiverse with a cardinal which increases according to a more than uncertain “time” referential?    
All  the foregoing doubtlessly is  to  be discussed;  nevertheless,  this  potential  discussion as  such 
should inspire us some suspicions concerning the possibility of founding the de facto satisfaction of 
the weak anthropic principle  on the basis of the sole multiverse hypothesis.
But anyway, despite all these serious difficulties, let us do as if  the anthropic multiverse vision was 
necessarily true. In other words, let us do as if the assertion “within an infinity of different parallel 
universes, there is 'necessarily' one which is fine-tuned according to the WAP preconditions, and 
this particular parallel universe, 'by chance' is 'ours'”  definitely held.
Well, but we must not forget that an universe being  fine-tuned according to WAP is a necessary but  
insufficient precondition for the emergence of the sapiens  and even of primitive life. An assertion 
like “the physical characteristics of the exo-planet  XYZ are identical to those of our earth, so the 
exo-planet  XYZ is inhabited by living beings absolutely identical to the sapiens” probably would 
not be unanimous. 
To  “explain”  by  the  multiverse  hypothesis  the  “infinitely”  improbable  but  nevertheless  actual 
occurrence of “our” universe being fine-tuned according to the WAP preconditions is one thing. To 
“explain” the evolution of living matter starting from inert matter and leading to the emergence of 
the  sapiens-sapiens is  another.  Let  aside  the fact  that  “(…) the estimated anthropic limitations 
on  fine-tuning  aren’t  anywhere  fine  enough  to  explain  the  experimental  confirmations  of 
the extreme precision of the elegant forms as fundamental laws” (Burov and Burov, 2015, p.8) and 
that  subsequently  any tentative to derive  directly from these fundamental laws the transitions 
…  … fmi(Σ)  →   fmi+1(Σ), … …. leading to the emergence of the sapiens would be a manner of 
building on sand. The principal problem, once again,  resides in the passage from the investigation 
field of physics which can legitimately be approached by group-theoretic means, to other fields 
where group theory becomes senseless, and here we recognize another aspect of what Bergson 
qualifies as “spatialization of time.”
The  string  theoretic  landscape  conception  has  essentially  group-theoretic  foundations.  So,  the 
extension  of  STL-vacua  to  parallel  universes  forming  a  multiverse  supposed  to  “explain”  the 
occurrence of “our” tailor made fine-tuned universe being exactly as it must be perhaps belongs to 
speculation, but it is at least physical speculation. By contrast, and  contrary to the history of our (?) 
inert universe, biological evolution is an evolution  stricto sensu. Let us represent the  biological 
evolution by our transition schema  …  … fmi(Σ)  →   fmi+1(Σ), … …. If there were for any i going 
from 0 to an undetermined value a group   Gi+1  formalizing  fmi+1(Σ),  and another  Gi  formalizing 
fmi(Σ), so that  Gi  ⊂  Gi+1, the transitions  …  … fmi(Σ)  →   fmi+1(Σ), … …., for any i would be 
globally governed by a transformation group  G :  Gi  →  Gi+1 specifying ultimately the Klein  V-
group. In other words, the transitions  …  … fmi(Σ)  →   fmi+1(Σ), … …. globally would conserve the  
same functioning mode, and this would by definition be incompatible with evolution stricto sensu. 
Since  on  the  other  hand,  the  absolute  absence  of  predictivity  and  retro-dictivity  in  biological 
evolution renders useless any consideration of symmetry or asymmetry in prediction and retro-
diction, the transformation group  G :  Gi  →  Gi+1 does not exist in this field. So, asserting any 
continuity between the fine- tuned universe and biological evolution starting from inert matter and 
leading to the emergence of the sapiens means to do as if the non-existing G :  Gi  → Gi+1 existed. In 
this case, it is not physical speculation, but speculation tout court. 
It  is  astonishing  that  physics being rightly aware of the improbability characterizing the physical 
– i.e. fine-tuned –  preconditions for the emergence of the sapiens-sapiens and his/her brain  seems 
(i) to  neglect  the  fact that these fine-tuned preconditions are necessary but insufficient ones, and 
(ii) to consider as negligible the problem of the tremendous improbabilities coming up beyond the 
fine-tuning issue.    
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